On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

Mostapha Diss () and Vincent R. Merlin ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.

Keywords: Self-selectivity; Stability; Instability; Scoring rules; Impartial Culture assumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00443854/en/
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Published, Theory and Decision, 2010, 69, 289-316

Downloads: (external link)
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/44/38/54/PDF/dissmerlin01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00443854

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Series data maintained by CCSD ().