The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

Ana B. Ania () and Andreas Wagener ()

Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover from Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract: We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

Keywords: Open Method of Coordination; Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Imitation; Mobility; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 H75 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process (2009)
Working Paper: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process (2009)
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