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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

No 421, IEHAS Discussion Papers from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

Keywords: dynamic solution; absorbing set; core; non-emptiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2003) Downloads
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002) Downloads
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