Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Bettina Klaus ()

No 09-017, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.

Keywords: Matching with Couples; (Maskin) Monotonicity; Nash Implementation; Stability; Weakly Responsive Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
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Working Paper: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (2008)
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