Abstract:
This paper compares documented corporate patent practice with the way the patent institution has been modelled in economics and management writing. In particular, there is common confusion of the patent’s role as a temporary exclusive development right (correct) and the idea that the patent is a temporary economic monopoly (possible, but often not the case). This difference is important for the judgement of whether the strategy of innovation suppression can take place. A number of examples of patenting practice presented in the management literature (Dunford 1987) are shown to be examples of the development of a workable prospect rather than the abuse of the patent system to suppress innovation. The problem with the patent institution is then, not the abuse of patent-protected monopoly, but the potential for abuse of the legal machinery of the patent system. Examples of such abuse are given, including lobbying efforts to change the law to favour private control over the public interest function of intellectual property law.
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