My Pay is Too Bad (I Quit). Your Pay is Too Good (You're Fired)

Johan M. Kuhn

No 07-5, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper is about how surpluses of labour contracts are shared by the employee and her firm. For this purpose, I look at the relationship between individual wages and employeremployee separation patterns. The paper suggests a model which estimates (otherwise unobserved) alternative wage and individual productivity measures from matched employer-employee data. These estimates can be used to address rent sharing hypotheses. Results of an application of the model to a large Danish register data set suggest that firms appropriate large shares of the returns to tenure. There is no evidence of gender discrimination with respect to rent sharing, and no evidence of rent sharing coefficients being different across regions which are distinguished by their labour market thickness.

Keywords: employer-employee separations; rent sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2007_005

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