Ann-Sofie Kolm () and
Birthe Larsen Additional contact information Birthe Larsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract:
While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. The same good is produced in the formal and in the informal sector. Moral considerations are determinant for whether the worker search for jobs in the formal or in the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment fees and a higher audit rate on wages, sector division, unemployment and welfare.
More papers in Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics Address: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Lars Nondal ().
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