Acquisitions, Multinationals, and Wage Dispersion

Fredrik Heyman (), Fredrik Sjoholm () and Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall ()
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Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall: European Institute of Japanese Studies, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 222, EIJS Working Paper Series from The European Institute of Japanese Studies

Abstract: Multinational firms pay relatively high wages. Less is known about the wage structure within multinational and non-multinational firms. We examine the impact of acquisitions on wage dispersion in Sweden using a large matched employer-employee data set. Foreign acquisitions of Swedish firms increase wage dispersion by increasing wages for high-skilled workers. The positive impact is concentrated to CEOs and managers, whereas other groups are either negatively affected or not affected at all. The impact on high-skilled workers’ wages seems to be caused by the acquisition rather than the ownership itself, since ownership changes from foreign to Swedish result in similar increases.

Keywords: FDI; Multinational Companies; Foreign ownership; Wage-Dispersion; Skill groups; Matched Employer-Employee data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 F23 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2006-01-10
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Working Paper: Acquisitions, Multinationals and Wage Dispersion (2006)
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