Voting Motives, Group Identity, and Social Norms

Fredrik Carlsson () and Olof Johansson-Stenman ()

No 366, Working Papers in Economics from Göteborg University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The conventional rational voter model has problems explaining why people vote, since the costs typically exceed the expected benefits. This paper presents Swedish survey evidence suggesting that people vote based on a combination of instrumental and expressive motives, and that people are strongly influenced by a social norm saying that it is an obligation to vote. Women and older individuals are more affected by this norm than others. The more rightwing a person is, the less unethical he/she will perceive selfish voting to be. Moreover, individuals believe that they themselves vote less selfishly than others and that people with similar political views as themselves vote less selfishly than people with the opposite political views, which is consistent with social identity theory.

Keywords: social norms; self-interested voting; expressive voting; sociotropic voting; selfserving bias; group identity; in-group bias; social identity theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2009-06-17

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0366

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