Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal

Niclas Berggren ()

No 108, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.

Keywords: Constitution; veil of ignorance; social contract; institutional competition; federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 H11 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-03

Published in Public Choice, 1996, pages 339-361

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Journal Article: Social Order through Constitutional Choice: A Contractarian Proposal (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0108

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