Political Polarization

Avinash Kamalakar Dixit () and Jörgen W. Weibull

No 655, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts, and consistent with Bayesian rationality.

Keywords: polarization; voting; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2006-08-22, Revised 2007-04-19
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