Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium

Jean-François Laslier () and Jörgen W. Weibull

No 692, Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a committee facing a binary decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information. Members may have different preferences and initial beliefs, but they all agree which decision should be taken in each of the two states of the world. We characterize the optimal anonymous and deterministic voting rule and provide a homogeneity assumption on preferences and beliefs under which sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium for this rule. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for sincere voting to be an equilibrium under any deterministic majoritarian voting rule. We show that a class of slightly randomized majoritarian voting rules make sincere voting a strict and unique pure-strategy equilibrium. A slight deontological preference for sincere voting, or ex post revelation of individual votes – ”transparency” – combined with a concern for esteem, has the same effect.

Keywords: voting; condorcet; committee; jury; judgement aggregation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2008-01-28, Revised 2008-03-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0692

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