Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment

Stefan Eriksson and Nils Gottfries ()

No 2000:8, Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation

Abstract: We formulate an efficiency wage model with on-the-job search where wages depend on turnover and employers may use information on whether the searching worker is employed or unemployed as a hiring criterion. We show theoretically that ranking of job applicants by employment status affects both the level and the persistence of unemployment and numerically that these effects may be substantial. More prevalent ranking in Europe compared to the US (because of more rigid wage structures etc.) could potentially help to explain the high and persistent unemployment in Europe.

Keywords: Efficiency wage; Turnover; On-the-job search; Labor mobility; Persistence; Ranking; Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-09
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Published in Labour Economics, 2005, pages 407-428.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ranking of Job Applicants, On-the-Job Search and Persistent Unemployment (2000)
Working Paper: Ranking of Job Applicants, On-the-job Search and Persistent Unemployment (2000)
Journal Article: Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2000_008

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