Skill loss, ranking of job applicants, and the dynamics of unemployment

Stefan Eriksson

No 2001:4, Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation

Abstract: This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment in an efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search. Firms are unable to differentiate wages and therefore prefer to hire employed searchers or unemployed workers who have not lost human capital. It is shown that if some fundamental factor in the economy changes, this will result in a lengthy adjustment process with substantial long run unemployment effects. Moreover, the model is capable of generating persistence but the amount depends on the duration of the shock itself

Keywords: Efficiency wage; Turnover; On-the-job search; Skill loss; Persistence; Short- and long term unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2001-04-27
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Related works:
Journal Article: Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2001_004

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