Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics

Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg () and Jörgen W. Weibull

No 585, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

Keywords: Welfare State; Social Norms; Social Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D19 D64 H31 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-pbe
Date: 2002-11-15
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Published in Journal of the European Economic Association 1, Papers and Proceedings, 2003, pages 533-542.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics (2003)
Journal Article: Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0585

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