Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications

Johan Stennek () and Thomas Tangerås ()
Additional contact information
Johan Stennek: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

No 685, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.

Keywords: Network Competition; Two-way Access; Access Price Competition; Entry; Regulation; Network Substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
Date: 2006-12-20

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp685.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0685

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Address: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().