Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis

Nicholas S. Economides () and Joacim Tåg

No 727, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers "on the other side" of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that generally net neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees "on the other side" of the market) increases total industry surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content and applications providers. Similarly, we find that imposing net neutrality in duopoly increases total surplus compared to duopoly competition between platforms that charge positive fees on content providers. We also discuss the incentives of duopolists to collude in setting the fees "on the other side" of the Internet while competing for Internet access customers. Additionally, we discuss how price and non-price discrimination strategies may be used once net neutrality is abolished. Finally, we discuss how the results generalize to other two-sided markets.

Keywords: Net Neutrality; Two-sided Markets; Internet; Monopoly; Duopoly; Regulation; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D40 D42 D43 L10 L12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-reg
Date: 2008-01-15
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp727.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis (2007)
Working Paper: Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis (2007)
Working Paper: Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0727

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Address: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().