Erik Lindqvist () and
Robert Östling ()
Additional contact information Robert Östling: Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 6501,113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract:
We study the effect of political polarization on government spending and redistribution using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Politically polarized countries have lower levels of redistribution and government consumption. The relationship between political polarization and the size of government is stronger in democratic countries, indicating that the effect goes through the political system. The results are robust to a large set of controlvariables, including GDP per capita and income inequality.
More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Address: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().
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