A Reexamination of Renewable Electricity Policy in Sweden

Sven-Olof Fridolfsson () and Thomas Tangerås ()

No 921, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Green certificates are the main instrument for promoting renewable electricity (RES-E) in Sweden. But certificates cover only a limited share of total RES-E production. Under partial coverage, crowding out may arise whereby costly new RES-E replaces inexpensive old RES-E. Granting certificates to all of RES-E production improves efficiency, but leaves windfall rent to otherwise profitable facilities. We also analyze transaction costs in the permit process for new RES-E in Sweden. Municipalities veto socially desirable projects because of asymmetrically distributed investment costs and benefits. We propose market-based permit fees rather than limited veto rights as a solution to this NIMBY problem.

Keywords: Crowding out; Green certificates; NIMBY; Transaction costs; Windfall rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 Q48 Q52 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ppm and nep-res
Date: 2012-06-18
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0921

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