Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders
Tommy Andersson,
Christer Andersson and
Dolf Talman ()
Additional contact information Christer Andersson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.
Forthcoming as Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman, 'Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders' in Annals of Operations Research, 2013.
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