Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets

Hans Jarle Kind (), Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup ()

No 2008/1, Discussion Papers from Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

Keywords: Market Structure and Pricing; Efficiency; Optimal Taxation; Incidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Date: 2008-01-25
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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets (2008)
Journal Article: Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_001

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