Multinationals, Minority Ownership and Tax-Efficient Financing Structures

Dirk Schindler () and Guttorm Schjelderup ()

No 2008/19, Discussion Papers from Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: We model how multinationals structure their borrowing and lending transactions and find that affiliates in high-tax countries have higher internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical capital than comparable domestic firms. We also show that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates.

Keywords: Multinational enterprises; tax-efficient financing structures; minority ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-17
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