Strategic Bargaining in Search Equilibrium

Espen R. Moen

No 02/1996, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce strategic wage bargaining in a search equilibrium model. We find that wages respond more an employment and output less to aggreagte shoks than when wages are determined by conventional Nash bargaining. Expectations about the stocks increase the volatility of wages even more.

Keywords: WAGES; BARGAINING; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J31 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_002

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