Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training

V Bhaskar and Steinar Holden ()

No 35/2002, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations for firm subsidised general training rely on wage compression across skill categories.

Keywords: competitive labor market; general training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training (2002)
Working Paper: Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training (2003)
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