Properties of a non-competitive electricity market dominated by hydroelectric power

Finn R. Førsund and Michael Hoel ()
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Michael Hoel: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway, http://folk.uio.no/mihoel/

No 07/2004, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: An important conclusion from the literature on hydropower is that if there are no other constraints than the available water reservoirs for a year, and operating costs are ignored, the competitive (and socially optimal) outcome is characterized by the (present value) price being constant through the year. A second important conclusion is that the outcome under monopoly generally will differ from this, provided that the demand functions differ across different days (or other sub-periods) of the year.We show that even if the demand function is the same all days of the year, the monopoly outcome will generally differ from the competitive outcome. The difference is caused by the profit function of a price-setting producer of hydropower being non-concave. This non-concavity can be caused by short-run capacity limits either on exports and imports of electricity, or on the supply of alternative electricity sources.

Keywords: Electricity prices; Hydropower (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L94 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ene
Date: Written 2004-04-29
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Related works:
Working Paper: Properties of a Non-Competitive Electricity Market Dominated by Hydroelectric Power (2004)
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