Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs

Niclas Berggren () and Nils Karlson
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Nils Karlson: The Ratio Institute, Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.ratioinstitutet.nu

No 3, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: According to many democracy theorists, there is an unavoidable trade-off between constitutionalism and the need for political action. This paper criticizes that belief. Rather, it argues that a division of power, while sometimes entailing high political transaction costs, can nevertheless be beneficial and that it is not necessarily the case that a division of power does entail high transaction costs. The analysis expands the framework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Constitutionalism is thus defended against one of its main perceived deficiencies: its bringing about gridlock. This does not always happen, and when it does, it is often a good thing.

Keywords: Political transaction costs; Constitutionalism; Political institutions; Division of power; Quality of political decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2002-09-11
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Published in Public Choice, 2003, pages 99-124.

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Journal Article: Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs (2003)
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