Blowing the Whistle

Jose Apesteguia (), Martin Dufwenberg () and Reinhard Selten
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Martin Dufwenberg: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.ne.su.se

No 2003:5, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Journal Article: Blowing the Whistle (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2003_0005

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