Optimal Taxation and Risk-Sharing Arrangements in an Economic Federation

Thomas Aronsson () and Magnus Wikström ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Aronsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

No 538, Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal taxation and risk-sharing arrangements in an economy with two levels of government. Both levels provide public goods and finance their expenditures via labor income taxation, where the tax base is responsive to the private agents' labor supply decisions. The localities are assumed to experience different random productivity shocks, meaning hat the private labor supply decisions as well as the choices of income tax rates are carried out under uncertainty. Part of the central overnment's decision problem is then to provide ax revenue sharing between the local governments. The optimal degree of revenue sharing depends on whether or not the localities/regions differ with respect to labor supply incentives.

Keywords: Optimal taxation; multilevel government; fiscal externalities; uncertainty; risk-sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D80 H21 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
Date: 2001-09-06
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.umu.se/ues/ues538.ps (application/postscript)
http://www.econ.umu.se/ues/ues538.ps.zip (application/postscript)
http://www.econ.umu.se/ues/ues538.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.econ.umu.se/ues/ues538.pdf.zip (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:umnees:0538

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics
Address: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Kjell-Göran Holmberg ().