Collective Action and Common Agricultural Policy Lobbying: Evidence of Euro-Group Influence, 1986-2003

Thomas Jonsson ()
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Thomas Jonsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

No 713, Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper attempts to explain Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the in.uence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership (so called Euro-groups). The analysis is based on panel-data for .fteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, e¤ective lobbying presents a collective action problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support, suggesting that farmer Euro-groups in.uence agricultural policy within the EU.

Keywords: Agricultural policy; political economy; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H43 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-eec and nep-pbe
Date: Written 2007-06-07

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