Economic incentives and the timing of births: Evidence from the German parental benefit reform 2007
Michael Neugart and Henry Ohlsson ()
Additional contact information Michael Neugart and Henry Ohlsson: Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Henry Ohlsson ()
Abstract:
Economic theory suggests that incentives matter for people's decisions. This paper investigates whether this also holds for less self-evident areas of life such as the timing of births. We make use of a nautral experiment when the German government changed its parental benefit system January 1, 2007. The policy changes strongly increased economic incentives for women to postpone delivery to the new year provided that they were employed. The incentives for women not employed were not the same, they could gain slightly from giving birth before the policy change. Applying a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, we find very strong evidence that women with an employment history near to the end of their term indeed succeeded to shift births and became subject to the new and more generous parental benefit system. We estimate the quantitative impact to correspond to a 5-6 percentage points increased probability to give birth the first seven days of 2007 rather than the last seven days of 2006 for employed women.
More papers in Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies from Uppsala University, Department of Economics Address: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Katarina Grönvall ().
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