Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund

No 2003:10, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sactions; workfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-ltv
Date: 2003-02-11
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Published in Journal of Economic Surveys, 2006.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research (2003)
Working Paper: Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research (2003)
Journal Article: Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_010

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