Delegation, Time Inconsistency and Sustainable Equilibrium

Henrique S. Basso ()

No 2008:15, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government's strategy. The method of Chari and Kehoe (1990) is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes. Countering McCallum's (1995) second fallacy, delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem, with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate.

Keywords: Central Bank; Monetary Policy; Institutional Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2008-10-31
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nek.uu.se/Pdf/wp2008_15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2008_015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Address: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Katarina Grönvall ().