Mattias Nordin ()
Additional contact information Mattias Nordin: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract:
This paper investigates how information affect voting behaviour. There exist a large literature suggesting that uninformed voters can use informational shortcuts or cues to vote as if they were informed. This paper tests this hypothesis using unique Swedish individual survey data on the preferences of both politicians and voters. I find that uninformed voters are significantly worse than informed voters at voting for their most preferred politicians. This suggests that uninformed voters can not make up for their lack of information using shortcuts. Furthermore, the errors uninformed voters make do not cancel out in large elections. Estimates suggest that the ruling majorities would have switched in almost 5% of Swedish municipalities had all voters been fully informed. The effects are estimated with both parametric and nonparametric estimation techniques.
More papers in Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics Address: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Katarina Grönvall ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .