Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams

Kohei Kamaga () and Kojima Takashi

No 391, PIE/CIS Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining Q-Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou-Dalton Equity.

Keywords: Q-Anonymity; Intergenerational equity; Generalized Lorenz criterion; Leximin principle; Utilitarianism; Simplified criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
Note: First version, September 10, 2007; Current version, August 8, 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piecis:391

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