Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Walter Bossert () and Suzumura Kotaro

No 426, PIE/CIS Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow's axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that a domain restriction can be imposed and completeness can be dropped without affecting the incompatibility. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship.

Keywords: Multi-Profile Social Choice; Infinite-Horizon Intergenerational Choice; Lexicographic Dictatorships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
Note: This version: August 9, 2008

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Related works:
Working Paper: Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice (2008)
Working Paper: Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piecis:426

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