Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential Facilities Doctrine

Reiko Aoki and Small John

No 167, Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We consider compulsory licensing of intellectual property as a remedy for anticompetitive practices. We identify aspects of intellectual property that could warrant a different remedy from those developed for access to physical essential facilities. Based on the analysis, we present a characterisation of optimal compulsory licensing for a simple market. We find that royalty payments offer a greater range of choices to a regulator than fixed fees. Thus, even though the marginal cost of supplying access to intellectual property is zero, some unit charging is likely to be efficient.

Keywords: essential facilities; intellectual property; access price; royalty; investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piedp1:167

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