Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma

Tilman Cornelius Becker (), Michael Carter () and Jörg Naeve ()

No 252/2005, Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim from Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany

Abstract: We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler's dilemma in which members of the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a fifth playing the cooperative solution of the game, i.e. a strictly dominated strategy. The experimental data suggest to analyze the game as one of incomplete information. Most strategies observed are in the support of its Bayesian Nash equilibria. A notable exception is the Nash equilibrium strategy of the original game.

Keywords: Traveler's Dilemma; Experiment; Experts; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
Date: 2005-01
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