Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann Dorothea Kuebler ()
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Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann Dorothea Kuebler: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, http://www.rhul.ac.uk/Economics/about-us/normann.html
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann () and Dorothea Kübler

No 04/02, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e¤ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More e¢cient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested. More e¢cient workers also earn higher wages. Employers’ pro…ts are usually not di¤erent from zero. Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions. We …nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.

Keywords: job-market signaling; job-market screening; sorting; Bayesian games; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-mic
Date: 2004-04, Revised 2004-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison (2003)
Working Paper: Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison (2005)
Journal Article: Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison (2008)
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