Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage

Marjorie Honig () and Irena Dushi
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Marjorie Honig: Hunter College, Department of Economics
Irena Dushi: International Longevity Center-USA

No 411, Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers from Hunter College: Department of Economics

Abstract: Demand for employment-based insurance is typically treated as an individual rather than a household decision. Dual-earner households are now the modal U.S. married household, however, and most firms offer family coverage as an option available to employees. Findings from a model estimating married workers' take-up of their own insurance with their own and their spouses' offers indicate that both own price and potential coverage under spouses' plans are important determinants of take-up. We find evidence of selection into jobs offering insurance among wives but not husbands. Findings also suggest that dual-earners are not aware of the potential wage/benefit trade-off. Data are from the 1996 panel of SIPP.

JEL-codes: J32 J10 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-lab
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:htr:hcecon:411

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