Long Cheap Talk

Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

Keywords: cheap talk; communication; long conversation; incomplete information; game theory; signalling; joint lottery; dimartingale; di-span (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-pol
Date: Written
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Published in Econometrica, 2003, vol. 71, pp. 1619-1660.

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Journal Article: Long Cheap Talk (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284

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