Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics

Sergiu Hart () and Andreu Mas-Colell ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the discrete case (related to "no-regret" and correlated equilibria), and also a new result on two-person potential games (for this result we also provide a discrete-time proof).

Date: 2001-08, Revised 2003-04
View citations in EconPapers

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 45, pp.375-394.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/abs/regret.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Regret-based continuous-time dynamics (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ron Peretz ().