Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Bezalel Peleg (), Hans Peters () and Ton Storcken ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.

Keywords: social choice correspondence; game form; effectivity function; constitutional implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2003-03

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, pp. 381-396.

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/dp323.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences (2003)
Journal Article: Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp323

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ron Peretz ().