On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set

Bezalel Peleg () and Peter Sudholter ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.

Keywords: NTU games; Mas-Colell bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, vol. 41, pp. 1060-1068.

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Journal Article: On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (2005)
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