Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart () and Andreu Mas-Colell ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.

JEL-codes: C7 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: Written
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http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/abs/uncoupl-st.html (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004)
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004)
Journal Article: Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp371

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