Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments

Ben Greiner (), Werner Guth and Ro'i Zultan ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games, one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputation effects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hitherto experimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded. Our experimental design eliminates all strategic factors and allows to focus on the effects of communication processes. We clearly find social effects, but none of revealed anonymity or salient communication. The social processes invoked are very heterogeneous but not irregular for different communicators.

Keywords: bargaining; communication; social utility; n-persons dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (2005)
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (2005)
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