Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models

Bezalel Peleg () and Hans Peters ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hea and nep-upt
Date: 2005-09
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Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (2005)
Journal Article: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (2009)
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