Better-Reply Strategies with Bounded Recall

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: A decision maker (an agent) is engaged in a repeated interaction with Nature. The objective of the agent is to guarantee to himself the long-run average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to Nature?s empirical distribution of play, no matter what Nature does. An agent with perfect recall can achieve this objective by a simple better-reply strategy. In this paper we demonstrate that the relationship between perfect recall and bounded recall is not straightforward: An agent with bounded recall may fail to achieve this objective, no matter how long recall he has and no matter what better-reply strategy he employs.

Keywords: Better-Reply Strategies; Regret; Bounded Recall; Fictitious Play; Approachability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2007-03
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Working Paper: Better-Reply Strategies with Bounded Recall (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp449

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