Mediators Enable Truthful Voting

Bezalel Peleg () and Ariel D. Procaccia ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial voting rule in which truth-telling always constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of voting rules where, given a mediator, truthful preference revelation is always in strong equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the family of feasible elimination procedures has the foregoing property.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2007-04
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Working Paper: Mediators Enable Truthful Voting (2007)
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