Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces

Jean-François Mertens (), Abraham Neyman () and Dinah Rosenberg ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We prove that games with absorbing states with compact action sets have a value.

Keywords: Games; Stochastic Games; Zero-sum; Minimax; Absorbing States; Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-07
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/dp456.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp456

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ron Peretz ().