Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria

Yakov Babichenko

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We study the problem of reaching Nash equilibria in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by ?finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-08
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